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Abstract
The software defined networking paradigm relies on the programmability of
the network to automatically perform management and reconfiguration tasks.
The result of adopting this programmability feature is twofold: first by design-
ing new solutions and, second, by concurrently making room for the exploitation
of new security threats. As a malfunction in the controller software may lead
to a collapse of the network, assessing the security of solutions before their de-
ployment, is a major concern in SDNs. In light of this, we have conducted
a comprehensive review of the literature on the experimental security analysis
of the control plane in SDNs, with an emphasis on vulnerabilities of the con-
troller software. Additionally, we have introduced a taxonomy of the techniques
found in the literature with regard to the experimental security analysis of SDN
controller software. Furthermore, a comparative study has been carried out of
existing experimental approaches considering the security requirements defined
by the Open Network Foundation (ONF). As a result, we highlighted that there
is a need for a standardization of the methodologies employed for automated
security analysis, that can meet the appropriate requirements, and support the
development of reliable and secure software for SDNs.
Keywords: Software Defined Networking, SDN, Security, Analysis, Survey.
1. Introduction
The growing demand for the efficient management and reconfiguration of
large-scale communication services in computer networks, has leveraged the
adoption of the network programmability paradigm of the Software Defined
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Networks (SDNs) [1]. The flexibility provided by network programmability al-
lows several solutions to be deployed for complex tasks and thus reduces the
need to replace the hardware/firmware of network devices. Among the many
advantages of using SDNs, is that it enables autonomic services to be installed
which are aimed at the optimization of network metrics, network virtualization,
migration, mobility and energy conservation [2].
Unlike the case of traditional network architecture, in a SDN, the switches
comprise the data plane and have two key features. First, the switches interact
with a logical network control entity, known as the SDN controller, to obtain
forwarding instructions. Second, they keep a flow table in which entries with
instructions are stored and evaluated so that they can carry out the forward-
ing of packets [3]. Generally, the function of the SDN controller is operated
by non-standard software that provides the necessary interfaces for network
services and management. In SDNs, the interaction between switches and con-
trollers generally occurs through an application programming interface (API).
The OpenFlow (OF) [4] protocol is recognized as the standard API for SDN and
it is recommended by the guidelines of the Open Network Foundation (ONF) 2.
Hence, the applications hosted by the controller can implement policies, routing
algorithms and other management services (e.g. load balancing, virtualization,
support for mobility etc.) to determine a set of entries in the flow tables of
the switches. Thus, the controller and applications act as the “brain” of the
network by forming the logical network control.
Security in SDN is a major concern that has recently attracted the attention
of the scientific community [5, 6]. This can be explained by the fact that the
programmability and centralized management of SDNs may either assist in the
implementation of security services or lead to the emergence of new security
threats which may compromise data and the network operations [7]. Compar-
atively, SDNs are more vulnerable to attacks than legacy networks [5]. It is
noteworthy that the OF specifications stipulate that communication between
the controller(s) and switch(es) must occur through a secure channel, that is, it
must be implemented by secure transport services (e.g. TLS). As well as this,
owing to the fact that many interfaces/operations in SDNs are not standardized,
there is no guarantee that any single mechanism can ensure proper security.
For this reason, the scientific community has dedicated a great deal of effort
to investigating potential security risks in SDNs [8]. On the one hand, one may
observe in the related literature the existence of several papers concerned with
i) carrying out reviews of security in SDNs, ii) defining concepts in theoretical
terms and iii) discussing possible security vulnerabilities, threats and counter-
measures [9, 7, 10, 11, 12]. On the other hand, an attempt has been made to
conduct experimental security analysis with focus on the detection of vulnerabil-
ities in different planes of the SDN architecture. In addition, another important
factor that should be taken into account is the set of security requirements ap-
plicable to each SDN plane. In specific terms, in the control plane context, [13]
2www.opennetworking.org
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describe the security requirements for SDN controllers, that are derived from
an analysis and classification of threats defined by the ONF in [14]. However,
as there is a great heterogeneity of methods designed for experimental security
evaluation in the literature, it is necessary to understand which of them can be
applied to assess the fulfillment of the recommended security requirements by
the controller software implementations.
In view of this, we present in this paper the results of an extensive review
of the most recent literature dedicated to the experimental security analysis of
controller software in SDNs. Our research study complements the findings of
current surveys that focus on general aspects of SDN security, e.g. [5, 7, 15, 16,
3], by providing a broader discussion of the techniques employed in the literature
for the experimental security analysis of controller software. In addition, we
introduce a taxonomy of the approaches found in the literature review and
conduct a comparative analysis of them considering the security requirements
defined by the ONF and the STRIDE security threat categorization model [17].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we describe the theoretical concepts of SDNs with focus on its
architecture, main components and security threats. In Section 3, we carry out
an extensive literature review with regard to the security analysis of controllers
and other closely- related components of SDNs. A discussion about the data
collected during the literature review is presented in Section 4. Following this,
we introduce a taxonomy and a discussion of the main methods employed for
the experimental security evaluation of SDN controllers in Section 5 and Section
6, respectively. Finally, we summarize the conclusions of the paper in Section
7.
2. SDN: Architecture and Security Threats
The purpose of the paradigm adopted by the SDNs is to decouple logi-
cal network control from packet forward by dividing the networking tasks into
three planes: the data plane, the control plane and the application/management
plane [3]. Figure 1 shows an overview of the SDN architecture with the three
planes included. In the SDN architecture, the interaction between the network
components in each plane occurs through specific interfaces. In this case, each
interface is classified as belonging to one of the four extremities of the architec-
ture: northbound, southbound, westbound and eastbound [2].
The data plane essentially consists of network switches that forward frames,
belonging to each flow, to other devices by means of a set of locally- installed flow
rules. The SDN controller is able to configure the forward task by installing the
flow rules into the switches proactively or reactively. In the reactive forwarding,
on receiving the first frame of a flow, a switch usually requests the SDN controller
to lay down the rules regarding that individual flow, and to keep those rules
active until the end of each stream. In the proactive forwarding, the controller
sends a set of rules to the switches that are defined a priori for each flow. In the
absence of a rule for a specific received flow, the switch may query the controller
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to obtain the new rule or forward the flow in the traditional way in accordance
with a prior configuration of the device.
Figure 1: SDN architecture abstraction.
In the control plane, the controller acts as a network operating system (NOS)
and provides the basic abstractions and functionalities needed for the imple-
mentation of the forward policies defined by the management entity of an Au-
tonomous System (AS). Controllers can communicate with each other to ensure
distributed network control. Alternatively, a controller can interact either with
other controllers belonging to a different AS or with legacy devices by means of
the westbound and eastbound interfaces, respectively [18]. In addition, a con-
troller can interact with the data plane through southbound protocols. In this
particular situation, although there exist several APIs and protocols designed
for SDNs, (such as the Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES)
[19], the Open vSwitch Database Management Protocol (OVSDB)[20] and the
Protocol-oblivious forwarding (POF)[21]), the OpenFlow protocol emerged as a
de facto standard owing to its wide acceptance by practitioners and manufac-
turers [3].
The application/management plane allows the network management entity
to monitor and execute control operations on the SDN, usually by interacting
with the controller(s) via northbound APIs/protocols, (e.g. RESTFUL APIs or
programming languages [3]). It should be mentioned that, although the theoret-
ical SDN architecture suggests that the application and control planes software
are completely independent, this premise is rejected by the current state of SDN
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controller software implementations. Generally, both the control and applica-
tion are a part of the same software and share computational resources. In light
of this, the northbound interface is often used by the applications for commu-
nication with external entities instead of the controller. Hence , as applications
may operate as plug-ins or particular modules tied to the controller software, it
is not unusual to experience collateral damage to the controller software caused
by the malfunction of some application.
Security in SDNs is an important research field because the programmability
and centralized management of SDNs may either assist in the implementation
of security services or lead to the emergence of new security threats which , in
turn, can compromise data and the network operation [7]. Comparatively, the
SDNs are more vulnerable to attacks than legacy networks [5]. In this sense
one may enumerate at least seven possible points of attack in SDNs (as shown
in Figure 1), which are as follows: the SDN switch, the data communication
between switches, the SDN controller, the southbound communication between
controller(s) and the switch(es), the east/westbound communication between
controllers or between application/management software, the northbound com-
munication between the controller and the application/management software
and the management/application software. It should be noted that the Open-
Flow specifications state that communication between the SDN controller(s) and
the switch(es) must occur through a secure channel (e.g. by using TLS). Despite
this, largely owing to a lack of standardization, there are no guarantees that the
current mechanisms are suitable and can meet all the security requirements of
SDNs.
Keeping these points in mind, in the next section, we outline the state-of-
the-art with regard to the experimental security analysis of controller software
in SDNs.
3. Literature Review
For this review, we carried out a rigorous and extensive verification of the
literature by checking the bibliographic repositories available on the Internet.
We selected a set of papers considering only the most relevant studies fully
or partially dedicated to the experimental security analysis of the
controller software in SDNs. More specifically, the literature review mainly
includes studies related to the following controllers: OpenDayLight, Floodlight,
Beacon, Ryu, POX, ONOS, NOX, Maestro and their variants.
Whilst there exist multiple solutions for south-bound SDN interfaces, e.g.,
PCEP [22], NETCONF [23], P4 [24], ForCES [19], I2RS [25], the OpenFlow [4]
is by far the most widespread existing solution. Thus, by examining the most re-
cent experimental analyses of security issues with regard to open SDN controllers
in the literature, we necessarily report studies related to innate OpenFlow-based
SDNs. For further detail about the security analysis of other south-bound pro-
tocols in SDNs, the reader should refer to [26].
Among the set of analyzed papers presenting practical and theoretical re-
sults, we selected only the experimental studies to be described in the following
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subsections. For ease of understanding, the selected papers were grouped ac-
cording to the main focus of each experiment carried out, as depicted in Figure
2, in: data plane; application and management plane; control plane and re-
gardless the SDN plane. After describing the selected experimental studies in
this section, we provide a comprehensive analysis of their security aspects in
Section 4 and Section 5.
Figure 2: Experimental security analysis of SDN Controllers road-map.
3.1. Security Analysis in the Data Plane
In this section we describe the experimental security analysis with regard to
the data plane, presented in [27], [28] and [29], respectively.
The authors of [27] analyzed the effects of overhead on the routing tables of
the SDN switches. As an experiment, the authors implemented a scenario in
which an attack was carried out by continuously sending several flows of forged
raw packets. In this case, only a small portion of the packet header was changed
between streams, so that an individual entry could be inserted into the switch for
each forged packet until the storage capacity was exhausted. According to the
authors of [27], when the resources of the switch are exhausted, the controller
is unable to install new entries for legitimate flows. To mitigate this type of
attack, they recommend that the controller should either wait until a flow entry
expires before inserting a new entry of a legitimate flow or directly forward the
legitimate flow through to another switch. The authors also conducted tests
to measure the delay, throughput, and packet drop rate when the flow table is
exhausted. The measurements were performed on the OpenDayLight (ODL)
controller that was configured with the two mitigation strategies. The tests
considered legitimate flows with only a subset of entries already installed in the
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switch and forged flows with no related entries in the switch tables. As a result,
the evaluation detected a performance degradation in the controller. In addition,
the tests also revealed a degradation in the throughput of the legitimate flows
when there were no entries installed in the switch; this was mainly due to the
extra work carried out by the controller to forward the packets to other switches.
The authors of [28] introduced a prevention scheme against attacks originat-
ing in compromised OpenFlow switches. A system scenario is defined in which
a compromised switch is able to launch three types of active attacks, namely,
incorrect forwarding (deviation or duplication of a flow), packet manipulating
and a malicious weight adjustment of the compromised switch group tables.
The authors created two algorithms to detect these attack vectors. The pur-
pose of the first algorithm, called Forwarding Detection, is to verify if the flows
are being correctly routed by the switches. To do this , the algorithm uses an
artificial packet to check the flow entries in the switch tables and tracks the
path traveled by the flow to determine the correctness of the path. The second
algorithm, called Weighting Detection, is used to check if the switch forwards
packets at an expected rate. The algorithm generates and sends a set of ar-
tificial packets to the evaluated switches and analyses the amount of received
packets. If the number of received packets is close to the expected value, the
flow is considered to be satisfactory; otherwise the flow is compromised.
Recently, in [29] the authors evaluated the link discovery service (LDS) vul-
nerability, which is an essential service of the control plane that is needed for
the proper operation of SDN services and applications. The authors provided
details of how an attacker can ”poison” the perception of the SDN controller
about the network topology, by introducing false links. They also explained
that such links can be created through the use of false Link Layer Discovery
Protocol (LLDP) messages, sent by one or more compromised hosts. As a re-
sult, the authors were able to simulate a scenario of a realistic link falsification
attack on the FloodLight controller implemented on the Mininet emulator.
3.2. Security Analysis in the Application Plane
In this section we describe different approaches in the literature committed
to assess experimentally the security of the application plane and the interfaces
for communication with the control plane.
The study [30] discusses the application failures that can result in the crash
of the SDN controller. More specifically, the authors address the problem of fail-
stop crash failures and Byzantine faults. The authors claim that the availability
of a SDN controller is decreased by the sharing of resources between the SDN
applications and controllers. This means that the crash of the former induces
the crash of the latter, and hence affects availability. They also examine the re-
lationship between applications and the network, where a Byzantine failure may
lead to the violation of network safety property and thus affect network avail-
ability. In view of this, the authors re-design the SDN controller architecture by
focusing on a set of abstractions to increase the resilience of controllers to faults
caused by applications. This new design has two objectives: to isolate the ap-
plications of the controller in order to eliminate resource sharing and isolate the
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network from application to allow consistent support for applications. The au-
thors tested and validated the new architecture by creating a FloodLight-based
isolation system called LegoSDN and discussed the hypothetical challenges of
their prototype.
The authors of [31] argue that application failures may either lead to losses
in the control plane or cause the permanent failure of the network operations.
They claim that problems caused by application failures directly interfere with
the proper functioning of the SDN controllers. Moreover, they indicate a lack
of solutions for this problem in the existing controllers. For this reason, they
developed a new controller called Rosemary, in order to offer more resilience to
application faults. The main features of Rosemary are a) its ability to isolate the
controller from applications, b) it can spawn applications as independent pro-
cesses, and also c) to monitor and control the resources of each application. The
authors compare Rosemary with three other controllers, namely, NOX, Beacon
and FloodLight. In the experimental analysis, they performed crash tests of
controllers induced by applications, memory leakage tests in the controllers and
unauthorized access test of memory structures. The NOX, Beacon and Flood-
Light controllers failed the tests, while Rosemary proved to be resistant to the
attacks due to the isolation provided by its architecture. Finally, the authors
carried out a performance comparison, which took account of the flow rate,
where the performance of Rosemary was far superior to that of FloodLight and
NOX but, in general, was similar to that of Beacon.
In [32], the authors introduced attacks in the application plane in which
an adversary spreads malicious applications to compromise the operation of the
network and also discussed possible protective mechanisms against such attacks.
They carried out three case studies of attacks that were triggered by malicious
applications installed in the FloodLight, ONOS, and OpenDayLight controllers.
The authors argue that a permission- checking mechanism could be implemented
to protect against these attacks. Moreover, in addition to this mechanism, they
also suggest conducting a static source code analysis and a dynamic analysis
based on code coverage test of the target application.
3.3. Security Analysis in the Control Plane
Here we describe the approaches employed for assessing security in the con-
trol plane and comparing the communication interfaces with the other planes
in SDNs.
The authors of [33] investigate the impact of software aging (SA) on SDN
controllers. The concept of SA was used to analyze the performance and security
of a system by observing the operating conditions of a software over an extended
period of time. The authors analyzed the impact of the SA on the FloodLight
and Beacon controllers. In the experiments, the controllers remained in opera-
tion for 36 hours, with alternating periods of high workload and idleness lasting
for twenty and five minutes, respectively. The authors used the cbench tool to
generate the workload (packet-in flows) for 16 Openflow switches at a rate of
100.000 flows/s. As a result, it was found that FloodLight used all the available
resident memory (4.2GB) of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) as well as all the
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virtual memory, including that stored on disk, making a total of 8GB of mem-
ory consumption. The memory management of Beacon was better since it used
approximately 500MB of resident memory and 5GB of virtual memory.
The study carried out by [34] is concerned with unauthorized access to SDN
controllers including threats originating from applications. The authors propose
a set of Authorization and Access Control rules as well as a reference monitor
named OperationCheckpoint, which is coupled to the FloodLight controller. The
improvements include the following: a) the definition of a set of rules for the
OpenFlow commands of a given application, b) the creation of unique identifiers
(IDs) for applications, c) Permission Management and d) persistent records
of actions and access to the controller. The authors validated the scheme by
evaluating the OperationCheckpoint in an environment emulated with Mininet.
The experiments were divided into two scenarios: one considering access to
the REST API and another considering access to the internal Java methods
implemented in the controller. The proposed OperationCheckpoint prevented
access to calls for the REST API methods, but allowed calls made through
Java methods due to the internality of Java. Finally, the authors measured the
latency that was introduced by using the OperationCheckpoint. There was an
average increase of approximately 367.125µs in the latency of the operations
performed by the controller.
Similarly to [34], the authors of [35] designed a configurable mechanism to
restrict access to system-level operations through the application of security
policies. The purpose of the system is to maintain control over third-party ap-
plications installed in the SDN controller and thus prevent attacks resulting from
malicious actions. In the mechanism, each network service that can carry out
sensitive operations, is held in a sandbox. Two modes of operation were defined:
detection and protection. In the detection mode, the operations are monitored
and the security breaches are only recorded in the log file. In the protection
mode, sandboxes can restrict the execution of operations by complying with
the security rules defined by the network administrator. The mechanism was
implemented and validated in the OpenDaylight controller within the Mininet
environment. The authors validated the mechanism by conducting effectiveness
and performance tests. The purpose of the effectiveness test was to determine
whether the security rules were being enforced for the strict execution of oper-
ations from two different applications. It was found that the mechanism was
able to contain the malicious operations satisfactorily in the tests. As a result of
the performance test, it was verified a reduction of less than 5% in the effective
transmission rate of the network due the control overload introduced by the
proposed mechanism.
The authors of [36] investigated the vulnerabilities in the OpenDayLight con-
troller with regard to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. The study addresses
two variants of threat vectors, namely, threats in the communication of the con-
trol plane and threats in the controller. The authors presented a MitM attack,
which intercepted messages between the SDN controller and a remote client,
with the aim of capturing the credentials of the controller. When carrying out
the attack, the authors assumed a scenario where the adversary is located on
9
the same LAN as the SDN controller and can capture packets. For this reason,
they executed the MitM attack on the communication of a remote terminal and
the OpenDayLight controller via the web DLUX interface of the controller. In
the experiment, the adversary captured HTTP (non-SSL) messages exchanged
between the web DLUX interface and the remote terminal. As a result, the
credentials of the controller were captured in plain text.
[16] conducted an experimental performance analysis of the respective open
source controllers: NOX, POX, Beacon, FloodLight, MuL, Maestro and Ryu.
The selected controllers were compared in terms of performance, scalability,
reliability and security metrics. The flow rate and latency metrics were used to
measure performance and scalability and covered scenarios in which the number
of hosts ranged from 1 to 256 and the number of switches from 103 to 107. In the
case of the reliability analysis, the authors measured the number of connection
failures and packet losses that occurred during an operational period of 24 hours
by examining workload values between 2, 000 and 18, 000 requests per second.
Finally, when investigating security issues, five types of malformed OpenFlow
packets were created to observe the behavior of the controller on receiving these
packets. As result of the experiments, it was noted that the Beacon controller
had a higher flow rate while the POX, NOX and Ryu had a very low flow rate.
In addition, Mul and Beacon had the lowest latencies. With regard to reliability,
Mul and Maestro presented higher packet drop rate than the other controllers.
Finally, despite having a poor performance, RYU achieved the best security
classification level.
The authors of [37] designed a new extension for the NOX controller, called
FortNOX, which implements a role-based authorization strategy, security re-
strictions and conflicts resolution between flow rules. FortXOX enables NOX
to check for real-time flow rule conflict. FortNOX employs a rule-based repre-
sentation method, called alias reduced rules (ARRs), and detects conflicts by
comparing the set of ARRs and the new installed rules. The authors validated
the scheme by estimating the computational time aggregated by the conflict
analysis and resolution employed in the FortNOX. As a result, the FortNOX
conflict analysis showed , on average, an increase of 7ms in the processing time
for each new flow rule request.
The authors of [38] introduced a security extension to the control plane to
provide security management and arbitration of conflicts which originated from
the insertion of multiple flow rules by distinct applications. The proposed ex-
tension layer, called the Security Enforcement Kernel (SEK), was implemented
on top of the FloodLight controller. The SEK conducts a Rule-based Conflict
Analysis (RCA) which acts as a conflict resolution mechanism that mediates all
the requests for installing new flow rules. The SEK has the following compo-
nents: an code authentication module; conflict detection and resolution; a state
manager; callback tracking; a permitting mediator; a flow policy synchronizer;
the separation of processes and a security audit service.
[39] present several attacks on controllers that violate the network topol-
ogy and the forwarding strategy in the data plane of SDNs. In addition, it
demonstrated the feasibility of launching attacks on four controllers: Maestro,
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POX, OpenDayLight and FloodLight. For this reason, the authors proposed
a new controller, - SPHINX. This controller is capable of detecting attacks by
dynamically learning new network behavior and giving an alert when it detects
a suspicious activity. In the experiments, the authors evaluate the controllers
with regard to the following attacks: ARP poisoning, Fake topology, Controller
DoS, Network DoS, TCAM exhaustion and Switch blackhole. As a result, they
observed the lack of resilience of OpenDayLight, FloodLight and POX to TCAM
exhaustion, DoS and Fake topology attacks, respectively. They report the re-
silience of SPHINX to all the attacks carried out. Additionally, with respect to
performance, the results show that SPHINX can verify 1, 000 policies at each
network update in ≈ 245µs, by generating an increase of ≈ 6% and ≈ 14.5% in
the processing and memory usage, respectively.
3.4. Security Analysis Regardless the Plane
In this section, we report the experimental approaches concerned with the
evaluation of the security without taking account of any specific plane in the
SDN architecture. For purposes of clarification , the approaches are grouped
in accordance with their research objectives, as follows : Network fingerprint-
ing threats, network topology threats, trust and risk assessment, virtualization
threats and availability threats.
3.4.1. Network Fingerprinting Threats
The authors of [40], [41] and [42] address the problem of the fingerprinting of
controller-switch interactions in SDNs. By fingerprinting the SDN, an adversary
can estimate the packet-forwarding logic, map the network topology and identify
controllers, which are all factors that may expose the network to threats.
In [40] and [41], the authors investigated the ability of a remote adversary to
determine (passively or actively) if any flow rule installation has been triggered
by a given packet. The rule of recognition attack is carried out by releasing new
streams with a cross-traffic generator. The results are obtained by means of the
statistical analysis of the Round-Trip Time (RTT) and packet-pair dispersion
of these flows. The dispersion between packet pairs refers to the time interval
between the complete transmission of two packets sent by a client on a particular
link [40]. When conducting the statistical analysis, the authors consider two
scenarios: in the first scenario, the packet does not trigger a new installation of
rules, while in the second scenario the packet does. In the experiments, it was
possible to determine that a packet is able to trigger the installation of a new
flow with an accuracy of 98.54%.
In [42], authors devised a network scanning tool called SDN scanner for
remotely fingerprinting a SDN network. The SDN scanner sends fake packets
to a particular target network and repeatedly estimates the response time of
each packet. In this way, the tool can determine whether flows are new or
already exist. Subsequently, the scanner statistically tests the samples from the
two sets to determine whether a given network is SDN or not. This can be
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carried out by means of statistical tests, such as t-test 3. As a result of the
experiments, the tool achieved a fingerprinting rate of 85.7%.
3.4.2. Network Topology Threats
The authors of [43] evaluated the security in SDNs with a special focus on the
OpenFlow protocol. In their study, the OpenFlow is analyzed on the basis of the
STRIDE security threat categorization model. When conducting the analysis,
a data flow diagram (DFD ) is used to model the OpenFlow so that it can be
combined with the vulnerabilities of the STRIDE threat categorization model,
and thus result in several Attack Trees. After the trees have been generated,
practical tests are carried out to validate the approach, such as: Denial of Service
(DoS) in the switch flow table, Denial of Service (DoS) in the switch input buffer
and fingerprinting the network to determine if a rule exists on a switch and if
the activity of a particular client can be tracked.
[44] assessed the security of the Open Flow Discovery Protocol (OFDP), a
variation of the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP). The OFDP is part of
the OpenFlow software distribution. However, OFDP does not support authen-
tication, integrity or confidentiality. Thus , it is susceptible to network topology
poisoning attacks through spoofed links. The authors of [44] conducted exper-
iments in which it was possible to create unidirectional and bidirectional false
links by using one and two infected hosts, respectively. In another scenario con-
sisting of five switches and five client hosts, the network connectivity is reduced
by 30% through the creation of one false link. As an improvement, the authors
suggest the use of a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) to en-
sure authenticity and integrity in the network. The authors report that the use
of OFDP with HMAC increases the network processing load by approximately
8%.
The authors of [45] examine attack vectors for SDNs based on the exploita-
tion of false links. The attacks are intended to poison the topology of the
network to mislead the core services of the controllers and applications. The
authors found failures in the Host Tracking Service and Link Discovery Ser-
vice systems in the SDN controllers. This led to a pair of poisoning attack
groups in the network, namely Host Location Hijacking and Link Fabrication
attacks. The Host Location Hijacking attack group encompasses Exploitation
in Host Tracking Service (HTS) attacks, in which an adversary impersonates a
legitimate host to capture the network traffic destined for the legitimate host,
and the Web Clients Harvesting, where the attacker impersonates a legitimate
web server. The Link Fabrication attack includes five variations: Exploitation
in Link Discovery Service, Fake LLDP Injection, LLDP Relay, Denial of Ser-
vice Attack, and MitM. The proposed attacks were successfully carried out on
the FloodLight, OpenDayLight, Beacon and POX controllers. As an improve-
ment, the authors added a new security extension to the Floodlight controller,
3The t-test is a well-known statistical hypothesis testing method that can be used to
determine if two sets of data are significantly different from each other.
12
called TopoGuard, which provides automatic and real-time detection of Network
Topology Poisoning Attacks.
The study [46] analyses the impact of attacks to SDNs through the latency
and packet loss observed in web services traffic. Without pointing out possible
countermeasures, the authors discuss vulnerabilities and security threats, by
highlighting the following : threats to SDN management, threats to the control
plane and threats to the data plane. Two types of attacks were carried out.
In the first attack, an adversary sends false requests as a means of keeping
the controllers and switches busy, as well as causing delay and data loss. In
the second attack, a malicious switch is employed to impersonate a legitimate
switch, which leads to a loss of connection with the SDN controller.
3.4.3. Trust and Risk Assessment
The study conducted by [47] deals with the question of trust analysis in SDN
controllers and their applications. The introduced approach relies on several re-
dundant controllers that are capable of operating in different environments.
The authors introduce an intermediate SDN layer that is located between the
switches and the controllers, called Trust-oriented Controller Proxy (ToCP), and
based on a hypervisor. The ToCP layer collects and analyses the rule installation
requests originating from distinct controllers and if they are deemed consistent
and trustworthy, it installs the rules on the network switches. The authors
made an evaluation of ToCP in a SDN network by taking note of the through-
put, packet loss, Jitter, memory and processing overheads. More specifically,
the functionalities of ToCP increased the Jitter and packet loss and reduced the
throughput by 13.6% in the worst case scenario. Similarly, the memory con-
sumption and CPU usage were also increased by 401MB and 0.4%, respectively.
In [48], the authors classified security threats by introducing a method of
risk assessment and countermeasures for some of the security issues pointed out.
They drew up a security checksheet to help network designers to determine risks
and find suitable countermeasures to mitigate them. The list of attacks was
combined with a prior list described in [49]. As an experiment, the authors
first made a qualitative assessment of an SDN testbed by using the proposed
checksheet. Afterwards, two Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were carried out
to quantitatively measure the performance degradation of the network.
3.4.4. Virtualization Threats
The authors of [50] analyzed the FlowVisor, which allows network virtual-
ization in SDNs. They found vulnerabilities in the FlowVisor isolation mecha-
nism, which were at risk of being exploited by a malicious entity in the network.
Moreover, the vulnerabilities that were found, allow traffic manipulation within
different virtual networks. The authors state that FlowVisor does not verify
permissions of SDN controllers. This allows a malicious controller to send pack-
ets to other controllers through FlowVisor. Thus, three variations of attacks
were identified: the VLAN ID access problem, field modification problem and
the wild card modification problem.
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3.4.5. Availability threats
It is noteworthy that a great number of papers in the literature address the
availability of resources by exploring Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in SDNs.
Among them, we selected one study to represent this category in this review,
[51]. A comprehensive review of Distributed DoS attacks on SDNs can be found
in [52].
In [51], the authors carry out an experimental evaluation of the impact of
DoS attacks on SDNs by looking at two types of DoS attacks against the control
and data planes. In the data plane, they examine two types of attacks aimed at
exhausting both the resources of the SDN controller and switches. The authors
concluded that an adversary controlling a single host is able to disrupt the
forwarding capability of a SDN network with relatively limited resources.
4. Experimental Environments for SDN Security Analysis
In this section, we present a comparative analysis of the literature. In the
case of each research study analyzed, we examined the following features of the
experiments conducted by the authors: the controllers used, the environments
and their hardware and software configurations and the supporting tools for the
security analysis.
4.1. Main Controllers
Currently, there exist hundreds of solutions for SDN controllers. Although
many of the these correspond to proprietary distributions, in the literature
we have sampled, most of the papers describe and validate SDN solutions for
open source controllers. Table 1 lists the controllers that appear in the selected
papers of the literature. The Table also shows the original version used of the
controller or the contribution, if improvements have been made to the original
controller. Notice that FloodLight is one of the most often used controllers
with no modifications. We observed that the controllers chosen for modification
are implemented in Java programming language. In these cases, the popularity
of Java is a parameter that may indicate the trend with regard to preference.
Table 2 shows the frequency in which the controllers appear in the papers we
analyzed. The only controller based on proprietary software found in our review
is HP VAN SDN, with a single occurrence. There are three controllers in the
top-five of the list, which are implemented in Java: FloodLight in 1st position,
OpenDayLight in 3rd, and Beacon in 4th. There are two controllers implemented
in Python, POX and RYU that are in 2nd and 5th places, respectively. Clearly,
One may observe that the popularity of the programming language used in the
design of the controller may be a strong indication of controller choice.
4.2. Experimental Environments
This section presents a data compilation of hardware and software used in
the experiments of the analyzed studies. The experimental environments can
14
Table 1: List of controllers addressed in the related literature.
Paper Controller (original) Contribution
[27] OpenDayLight
[40] Floodlight v0.9
[33] Floodlight e Beacon
[28] Ryu
[43] POX
[34] Floodlight OperationCheckpoint
[35] FloodLight, Beacon, Open-
DayLight and HP VAN SDN
Application containment
mechanism with sandboxes
over OpenDaylight Hydrogen
[53] FloodLight, ONOS, Open-
DayLight, Ryu and POX
[44] POX
[47] Floodlight v0.9
[36] OpenDayLight Helium
[16] NOX, POX, Beacon, Flood-
light, MuL, Maestro and Ryu
[42] NOX, Beacon and Maestro
[31] Floodlight, OpenDaylight,
POX and Beacon
Rosemary
[32] Floodlight, OpenDaylight
and ONOS
[37] NOX 0.9.1 FortNOX
[30] FloodLight LegoSDN (FloodLight)
[46] POX
[48] Ryu 3.24 security checksheet
[50] POX 0.1.0
[39] FloodLight, Maestro, Open-
Daylight and POX
SPHINX
[38] FloodLight Security Enforcement Kernel
(SEK)
[45] FloodLight, OpenIRIS, Open-
DayLight, Beacon, Maestro,
NOX, POX and Ryu
TopoGuard (FloodLight)
[29] FloodLight 1.2
[51] Ryu (version 3.22), ONOS
(version 1.10.0) and Flood-
light (version 1.0)
be grouped into three categories : simulated environment (SE), physical envi-
ronment (PE) and emulated environment (EE). Table 3 shows the classification
of the environments, as described in each paper regarding the three categories
. The network emulator Mininet4 was the predominant system in all the works
that use emulated environments.
Table 4 shows details of the software configuration of the experimental envi-
ronments discussed in each study. In a few cases, the authors clearly indicated
the use of virtual machines (VMs) and we check marked those cases where the
authors did not state the name or the version of the VMs. With regard to
the operating systems (OS), we included the name and version described in the
experiments. In the switch column, we showed the number of switches used
in the experiments, followed by the model of the switch (virtual/software or
physical). The last column shows the number of hosts used in the experiments.
All the blank cells refer to studies in which the related item was not described.
4http://mininet.org/
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Table 2: Frequency of controllers in the analyzed papers.
Controller Papers Amount
FloodLight [40], [33], [34], [35], [53], [16],
[31], [32], [30], [39], [38], [45],
[47], [29], [51]
15
POX [43], [53], [44], [16], [31], [46],
[50], [39], [45]
9
OpenDayLight [27], [35], [53], [36], [31], [32],
[39], [45]
8
Beacon [33], [35], [16], [42], [31], [45] 6
RYU [28], [53], [16], [48], [45], [51] 6
NOX [16], [42], [37], [45] 4
Maestro [16], [42], [39], [45] 4
ONOS [53], [32], [51] 3
MuL [16] 1
HP VAN SDN [35] 1
Rosemary [31] 1
SPHINX [39] 1
OpenIRIS [45] 1
It should be noted that [32, 30, 29] did not specify any of the software used in
their experiments.
The overview, obtained from this data compilation, may support the choice
for setups of SDN testbeds in future works, as well as providing the metrics and
parameters required for qualitative evaluations between experimental platforms.
4.3. Main Supporting Tools for the Security Analysis
The use of consolidated supporting tools is essential for the experimental
process. As well as making the process easier and providing greater reliability,
consolidated tools can be cost-effective and save time employed in the design,
implementation and deployment of a specific platform to conduct the experi-
ments.
We enumerated the supporting tools of the literature and estimated the
number of papers citing them. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the tools applied
in security-related experiments in the analyzed literature. The Mininet emu-
lation environment was the most common supporting tool. In the context of
experimental evaluation in SDN, Mininet is a general purpose tool. It is able to
emulate computer networks through virtualization, by enabling the use of full-
featured virtual machines with lightweight operating systems, as well as switches
capable of running all the OpenFlow protocols. When instantiating network ele-
ments through VMs, Mininet provides flexibility for fast prototyping of realistic
network scenarios, with varied topologies and data transmission technologies.
Apart from Mininet, there are two other important supporting tools for packet
capturing and network analysis that often appear in the literature: scapy5 and
cbench6.
Scapy is a packet manipulation software for capturing, creating, and modify-
ing network packets. On the other hand, cbench is a benchmark tool that is able
5http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
6https://github.com/mininet/oflops/tree/master/cbench
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Table 3: Types of experimental environments adopted in the analyzed papers.
Paper SE PE EE
[27] X X
[40] X
[41] X
[33]
[28] X
[43] X X
[34] X X
[35] X X
[44] X X
[47] X
[36] X
[16]
[42] X
[31] X X X
[37] X
[46] X X
[48] X
[50] X X
[39] X
[38] X
[45] X X X
[29] X X
[51] X
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Table 4: Configurations of software, nodes and data links of the experiments discussed in the
analyzed papers.
Study VM OS Switch # Hosts
[27] X Ubuntu 13.04 6 20
[40] - - 3x NEC PF5240 20
[41] - - 3x NEC PF5240 20
[33] - - - -
[28] - - 3x Centec V330 -
[43] - - 2 6
[34] VirtualBox Ubuntu 12.04 Open Virtual
Switch
-
[35] - Ubuntu 64-bit - -
[44] X Ubuntu Linux - - -
kernel 3.13.0 - -
kernel 3.8.0 HP 5900 (JG336A) 2
[47] VirtualBox - - 2
CentOS 6.4 - -
[36] - Kali Linux - -
Windows 7 - -
[16] - Ubuntu 12.04.1 - -
[42] - Linux HP 5406zl -
[31] - - - 3
[37] - Ubuntu Server 10.10 HP ProCurve
E6600
2
[46] VMWare ESXi - - 20
[48] X Ubuntu 14.04 Pica 8 P-3297 3
[50] - Debian Wheezy Open vSwitch 1.10 4
[39] - Ubuntu 12.04 14x IBM
RackSwitch G8264
10
[38] - Linux Open vSwitch -
[45] - - TP-LINK
TL-WR1043ND
and LINKSYS
WRT54G
(OpenWRT)
-
[51] X - OpenvSwitch
(OVS) version 2.5.0
-
to configure a number of hosts and switches that generate workloads (packet-
in) to a target controller, while allowing its performance to be assessed through
different QoS metrics such as latency and throughput. In the experiments de-
scribed by the papers we have examined, scapy was used to generate and send
a stream of specific packets or spurious messages to the network. Otherwise,
cbench was generally used to measure the performance of the controllers. We
noted that cbench was applied to determine the impact in the performance of
controllers when a countermeasure is implemented as a new system functional-
ity.
In addition to scapy and cbench, there are also other common tools used in
the literature to perform several types of attacks, as well as for the discovery
and exploitation of vulnerabilities in SDNs, such as:
• Kali Linux7: an operating system that provides a number of internal tools
to find and exploit vulnerabilities in several networked computing systems.
7http://www.kali.org
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Figure 3: List of supporting tools and occurrences by year found in the literature review.
• Wireshark8 and tcpdump9: sniffer software for capturing and analyzing
data packets and network protocols.
• Nmap10: a software used to perform scanning of open ports on a target
remote host.
• hping311: a software for launching denial of service (DoS) attacks.
• arpspoof12 : a software for supporting man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.
• tcpreplay13: a software for capturing, modifying and injecting data pack-
ets.
5. Security Analysis of Controller Software
In this Section, we discuss the methods found in the literature dedicated
to evaluating the controller software security in SDNs. First, we present a dis-
cussion about the methods used for security threat modeling. After this, we
conduct a comparative analysis to show the relationship between the reported
studies and security requirements defined by ONF. Finally, we introduce a tax-
onomy for the existing techniques applied to verify and validate the security
requirements of Controller Software in SDNs.
8https://www.wireshark.org
9https://www.tcpdump.org
10https://nmap.org
11https://tools.kali.org/information-gathering/hping3
12http://linux.die.net/man/8/arpspoof
13http://tcpreplay.synfin.net/
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Figure 4: Methods for security analysis and the related amount of papers found in our review.
5.1. Security Threat Modeling and Classification
In the set of papers, we analyzed the Microsoft model for security threat
classification (STRIDE) [17] and Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) appear as the
most widely used threat modeling techniques. STRIDE, allows the security of
a system to be classified into six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,
Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privileges. With the
aid of DFDs, the security analyst is able to make a graphical representation of
the software components, the inputs and outputs, as well as the internal logical
processes [54]. Besides STRIDE and DFD, there are other alternative methods
to assist the modeling of threats and security vulnerabilities. One of them is
the Attack Tree, which is able to classify the ways needed to detect a security
breach. The last method, the Petri Net, is a classic mathematical modeling
language.
—————-
Figure 4 illustrates the trend in the use of threat modeling techniques, as
revealed in the number of published papers, during the years.
Figure 5 shows trends regarding the interest in each STRIDE category, re-
flected in the number of papers addressing them. The greatest interest was
displayed in the Denial of Service attack types since these can either lead to the
network malfunction or collapse. However, there is also an increasing concern
about spoofing threats.
With respect to security properties, Figure 6 illustrates the trend in the
area of research, by showing the number of papers referring each security prop-
erty. It should be noted that the terms “authentication” and “availability” are
mentioned in most of the papers we analyzed. This is consistent with the oc-
currence of the related terms in the STRIDE model. However, it is also clear
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Figure 5: The number of papers, found in our literature review, citing each STRIDE category
terms over the years.
that authorization has also attracted greater attention in the last two years.
According to the review carried out, the STRIDE model is widely adopted
and is currently the standard method for categorizing security threats [43]. We
set out guidelines in our literature review with regard to security threats, by
classifying the papers described in Section 3 based on the STRIDE model, as
shown in Table 5.
5.2. ONF’s Security Requirements for SDN Controllers
To the best of our knowledge, the recommendations of ONF [13] are the
first known security requirements defined for SDN controllers. There are several
approaches in the literature that deal with network security in SDN, as discussed
in the previous sections. However, they mostly focus on a single vulnerability
or threat. The requirements defined in [13] are important because they provide
the basis of a security analysis by stressing the need to evaluate several points
of vulnerability.
Several surveys have been carried out with focus on the analysis of security
in SDNs [5], [7], [15], [16], [3]. However, the ONF [13] report is a technical doc-
ument containing a comprehensive practical coverage of security requirements
for SDN controllers.
Although a security evaluation of SND controllers is presented in [13], it is
restricted to the analysis of five controllers for a subset of the ONF requirements.
In light of this, there are open research issues for further investigation on the
security of SDN controllers considering two scopes: in breadth, given that there
is a wide diversity of controllers; and in depth, by taking into account all the
ONF requirements.
Table 6 lists the analyzed studies which address both the general and specific
ONF security requirements [13]. On the one hand, it was noted that some
requirements have attracted more interest among researchers, (in Table 6 items
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Figure 6: The amount of papers, found in our literature review, referring to each security
property along the years.
Table 5: Literature studies classified according to the STRIDE model.
Paper S T R I D E
[27] X
[28] X X
[40] X
[41] X
[55] X X X X X X
[43] X X X X X X
[44] X X
[45] X X
[53] X X X X
[33] X
[34] X X X X
[35] X X X X
[36] X X X X
[16]
[56] X X X X X X
[37] X
[30] X
[46] X
[48] X X X X X X
[39] X X X
[38] X
[45] X X X X
[29] X
[51] X
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Table 6: Relation between ONF’s security requirements and the studies found in the literature
review.
# General Sec. Requirements Studies Amount
1 IP check [55], [43] 2
2 User authentication [55] 1
3 Account management [55] 1
4 Hardware consistency - 0
5 Hypervisor security - 0
6 Software package integrity - 0
7 Protecting the integrity of data in transit [28], [55], [44],[45], [36] 5
8.a Log function - 0
8.b Log files access protection - 0
8.c Log modification protection - 0
9 Protecting the confidentiality [28], [55], [44],[45], [36] 5
10 Hiding password and keys display - 0
11 Traffic separation [55], [43], [50] 3
12 Access control on the GUI - 0
13 VM security - 0
14 Physical host security - 0
15.a Anti-DoS from computing Capacity ex-
haustion
[55] e [33], [39], [51] 4
15.b Closing unnecessary ports/services [55], [43] 2
16 Authorization for using system function-
alities
[55], [43], [35] 3
17 Interface authorization for third parties [55], [53], [35] , [38] 4
18 Security of the hosting OS - 0
# Specific Sec. Requirements Studies Amount
1 Authentication on interfaces of SDN con-
trollers
[55], [43], [46], [45] 4
2 Protecting reference data from unautho-
rized modification
[55], [53] 2
3 Authorization for access to sensitive data [55], [53], [36] e [31] 4
4 Hiding password and keys display - 0
5 Application isolation [37] , [38] 2
6.a Restriction for forwarding packets from
switches
[40], [41], [43], [55], [42] 5
6.b Authorization for flow table creation [55], [53], [35], [50], [38] 4
6.c Anti-DoS from north-/south-bound in-
terfaces (A-CPI, D-CPI)
[55], [43], [46], [39] 4
6.d Anti-DoS from excessive resource con-
sumption
[55], [33], [51] 3
7 Privileged control of applications [55], [35] , [38] 3
8 Policy conflict resolution [35], [37] , [38] 3
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7, 9 of General Sec. Req. and items 6.a and 6.b of Specific Sec. Req.). On the
other hand, several requirements were not addressed by any study (in Table 6
items 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 18 of General Sec. Req. and item 4 of
Specific Sec. Req.). Among the papers we examined, only [27] does not fit into
any ONF requirement. Since none of the requirements directly addresses the
security in SDN switches, the study [27] was not included in Table 6.
6. Dicussion
In most of the papers we analyzed, there is no concern about the details
of the security evaluation methodology that was employed (e.g. description of
techniques, experimental setup, assumptions, validation metrics and description
of expected results). This lack of detail often hampers the reproducibility of
the experiments, their continuation or the ability to compare the experimental
results with those of other studies. We observed that the methods employed
are restricted to the implementation of different attacks, which were designed
to detect the vulnerabilities of the SDN controllers.
In addition, in the literature, there is a lack on the definition of groups
and categories for the types of techniques used in the security analysis of SDN
controllers. We propose a taxonomy as a contribution to fill this gap, which is
illustrated in Figure 7. This taxonomy classifies the security analysis process
into two broad categories: active, when the analysis requires introducing of
some action in the observed environment; and passive, when only desired events
are passively observed in the environment. In the passive analysis, the capture
and analysis of network packets were the most common techniques found in the
literature employed to discover the network topology of a target SDN network.
On the basis of the review we carried out, the active security analysis can
be divided into two branches: external, when the action happens is beyond
the scope of the controller, i.e., when it occurs by means of the mediation of
other nodes in the network; and internal, when the action takes place within
the controller.
The active-external analysis comprises two techniques: the Control mes-
sage generation where the message flow may be either from or to the controller
and takes place by means of the (re)injection of original control messages (e.g.,
Man-in-the-Middle attack), malformed control messages, network topology con-
trol messages (e.g., fingerprint) or control messages carrying non-legitimate data
(e.g., fake topology); and the Data flow Generation where the flow may be
either from or to the controller, and occurs by means of the injection of an
exhaustive data flow (e.g., DoS), a data flow to discover the SDN topology (e.g.
fingerprint) or data flows conveying illegitimate data (e.g. arp poisoning).
The active-internal analysis can be divided into three main categories: im-
plementation flaws, malicious applications and unexpected behavior of
the controller. It should be noted that there is a close correlation between these
three subcategories. At first sight they may seem similar, since a malicious appli-
cation may accomplish an attack or an unexpected event may occur if there is a
failure of implementation (i.e. vulnerability) in the controller. However, the first
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Figure 7: Taxonomy considering the techniques used for security analysis of SDN controllers.
subcategory is most often related to flaws in the core of controllers regardless of
the applications. The second, is related to the exploitation of security breaches
by malicious applications disregarding any flaw in the controller. Otherwise, the
last subcategory assesses the tolerance of the controller to unintentional threats
in which legitimate applications may perform unauthorized/unexpected actions
(e.g., an application may exhaust the primary memory, leading to collapse of
the controller).
Table 7 shows the classification of the approaches described in this survey
according to the proposed taxonomy for the experimental security analysis of the
SDN controllers. It is worth noting that some studies may appear in more than
one category, since they perform different experiments to detect vulnerabilities
in the controllers. It has been found that a greater effort has been made by the
academic community to conduct active-external analysis through the exhaustive
generation of data flows and the active-internal analysis of Malicious Software.
These attempts reflect a concern that is consistent with the severity of the
security breach in those cases, which may lead to the controller and also, at
some point, the network becoming unavailable.
6.1. Future Directions
The literature provides a range of heterogeneous techniques that can be used
although there is a lack of a common methodology for experimental security
analysis, that is applicable to the overall SDN, and in particular, the controller
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Table 7: The selected papers in the proposed taxonomy.
Category Studies
— 1 Active
—— 1.1 External
———— 1.1.1 Control Message Generation
—————— 1.1.1.1 Original Messages [36]
—————— 1.1.1.2 Malformed Messages [16]
—————— 1.1.1.3 Topology Discovery [40], [41]
—————— 1.1.1.4 False Data [39], [44], [29], [45]
———— 1.1.2 Data flow Generation
————— 1.1.2.1 Exhaustive [43], [46], [48], [39], [27], [33], [51]
————— 1.1.2.2 Topology Discovery [43], [42]
————— 1.1.2.3 False Data [39]
—— 1.2 Internal
———— 1.2.1 Imp. flaws in the controller [31] , [30]
———— 1.2.2 Malicious Software [35], [38], [34], [37], [47], [50], [32]
———— 1.2.3 Unexpected Behavior [39], [28]
— 2 Passive
—— 2.1 Topology Discovery [40]
software. Such methodology is important to enable SDN designers to improve
the resilience of the controller core and the resistance of applications to attacks.
As the SDN technologies differ on the programming languages and environ-
ments, they require some level of abstraction in the definition of this methodol-
ogy. However, a methodology for security analysis should at least describe the
techniques used, the metrics for validation and a list of expected results. More-
over, it is also preferable to include automatic tests to quantify and certify the
security level of the controller software with regard to the ONF requirements,
regardless of the hardware configuration.
7. Final Remarks
In this paper we carried out an extensive review of the literature regarding
the security of controller software in SDNs. We compiled the main features
of the experimental setups and highlighted the many factors involved in the
experimental security evaluation of SDN controllers.
With regard to the controller software, the literature review showed a ten-
dency of studies related to security issues involving the OpenDayLight, POX
and Floodlight controllers. In addition, we enumerated the most common hard-
ware configuration and tools used to support the experimental security anal-
ysis. Among these tools, the results pointed out a large preference for the
use of Mininet emulator. With regard to security threat modeling, the review
found that the STRIDE model was widely adopted. This study makes a con-
tribution to the field by classifying literature considering the STRIDE model.
Furthermore, we analyzed the relation of the literature to the ONF security re-
quirements and identified the requirements that were met by each study. Lastly,
we created a taxonomy of the different approaches found in the literature re-
view considering the techniques employed used in their experimental security
analysis.
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It should be stressed that the literature regarding the experimental security
analysis of the implementation of the network controllers is still limited. Despite
the great academic interest in SDN security, there is still a lack of research on
finding a common methodology for automatically evaluating the security of
SDN controllers. Additionally, there is also an absence of methodologies and
techniques for automatic risk analysis to estimate the extent of the damage that
an insecure controller can inflict on the network.
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